We explore the design of self-financing tax-subsidy schemes to solve hold-up problems in environmental regulation. The announcement of the tax rate seems to be preferable to solve hold-up problems with respect to the investment in environmental R&D. In contrast, only the announcement of the subsidy rate is adequate to solve hold-up problems with respect to the licencing of environmentally friendly technologies. Altogether, the announcement of the subsidy rate yields a higher expected social welfare than the announcement of the tax rate or the standard emission taxation, if the marginal damage of emissions exceeds a certain level.
Introduction
Self-financing tax-subsidy schemes can be a powerful policy tool to spur welfare-enhancing investments and licencing in oligopolies. Consider environmental regulation settings, where firms can make costly investments in the development of non-polluting technologies and where one firm can obtain a licence for the non-polluting technology if another firm has developed it. Firms may behave strategically by investing little or refusing to apply for a licence, saving costs, and hoping to force the regulator to adopt looser regulations, which is denoted as hold-up problem. Self-financing tax-subsidy schemes treat firms alike, whether they invest enough / become a licencee or not. If one firm produces with a non-polluting technology and the other causes emissions, the polluting firm must pay taxes, which are used in turn to subsidise the environmentally friendly firm. The regulator can credibly trigger investments in the development of environmentally friendly technologies and a licencing of the environmentally friendly technology.
Hold-up problems are real-world phenomena. For instance, the standards specified by the 1970 American Clean Air Act were repeatedly delayed. Most dramatically, faced with industry claims that the proposed emission standards would shut down factories, Congress amended the Act in 1977, thus both weakening and postponing the standards. Similarly, in 1988 the government delayed standards for the 1989 model year. Further evidence of the hold-up problem can be found in Weimann (1995) , who illustrates how the "cartel of silence" on the part of engineers prevents the government from imposing tighter regulations.
Another recent example illustrates credibility problems. In 1998, Congress included a provision in the highway bill that delayed the first steps towards bringing states into compliance with the Clean Air Act's long-standing goal of "reasonable progress" toward eliminating man-made haze in specially protected areas for six to nine years. Until Congress intervened, the Environmental Protection Agency had planned to ask states to file preliminary plans by 1999, showing how they would eventually raise visibility standards gradually over the next few decades by complying with the new rules that had been proposed two years earlier. 1 We analyse hold-up problems in the context of environmental R&D investments as well as the licencing of environmentally friendly technologies and evaluate whether self-financing mechanisms can overcome existent hold-up problems. In addition, we compare the social welfare implications of two alternative tax-subsidy mechanisms and of the standard emission taxation.
Our scheme might be applied as a feebate-system in the automotive sector to promote the sale of environmentally friendly cars. Feebates refer generally to fees on fuel-inefficient vehicles and rebates on fuel-efficient ones. A first option of a feebate-system is taxation of the purchase of cars which exceed a certain emission level, and to refund the tax revenues to the buyers of cleaner cars. A second option is the implementation of a feebate-system at the industry level, which would be equivalent to our tax-subsidy scheme. The production of environmentally friendly cars could be subsidised by using the revenues from the taxation of the production of environmentally harmful cars.
Relation to the Literature
Our paper relates to different strands of the literature. Gersbach (2002) has suggested self-financing tax-subsidy mechanisms as a solution for hold-up problems by announcing subsidies when firms compete à la Cournot. Breitscheidel and Gersbach (2003) has discussed the question whether the regulator should set taxes or subsidies when using tax-subsidy mechanisms.
Additionally, our paper is related to the literature about the original hold-up problem, where a firm facing a single buyer may find investment unprofitable if, after making the investment, the buyer offers to pay only marginal costs. This has been discussed in Klein, 1 See New York Times, May 27, 1998. Crawford and Alchian (1978), Joskow (1987) , Williamson (1983) , and in the incompletecontract literature (see the survey by Hart (1995) ).
The idea that threats or promises by the government may not be credible has already been discussed in literature on trade protection (Staiger and Tabellini (1987) , Matsuyama (1990) , Tornell (1991) ), regulation of utilities (Salant and Woroch (1992) ), Gilbert and Newbery (1994) , Urbiztondo (1994) ), and privatisation (Levy and Spiller (1997) ). The hold-up problem is only solvable if there are means which make governmental regulation credible. In our paper, we analyse the investment and licensing incentives of two alternative self-financing tax-subsidy schemes in comparison to the incentives of the standard emission taxation.
Our analysis also relates to mechanism design that uses the tools of multi-stage games and subgame perfect equilibria (see Varian (1994) or Moore (1992) for a review of the literature).
Tax-subsidy mechanisms are examples of subgame perfect implementation of environmental regulation.
Our paper refers to work about the incentives to adopt clean technologies in the design of environmental policy instruments. Milliman and Prince (1989) and Jung, Krutilla and Boyd (1996) examine firms' incentives to invest in new technology, and provide a ranking of different policy instruments (see also Laffont and Tirole (1996) , Requate (1995) and Requate and Unold (2002)). In our context, we examine incentives to invest in clean technologies when a firm can influence the tightness of regulation by its investment decision.
Since we are considering R&D-processes, there is a connection to the literature about the incentives of environmental regulation to innovate in clean technologies (Innes and Bial (2002) , Porter and van der Linde (1995). Strategic firm behaviour plays also an important role in this context (Yao (1988) , Malik (1991) , Biglaiser, Horrowitz and Quiggin (1995)).
Finally, our paper is related to work about licencing (Gallini (1984) , Katz and Shapiro (1989) ).
Model
We consider an industry with two firms denoted by i = 1, 2 producing a homogenous good.
The firms compete a la Cournot and the marginal cost of production is zero and is independent of the installation of abatement technology.
is the industry's output, where q i denotes the output of firm i. Social welfare depends on consumer surplus S(Q), on producer surplus net of investment costs P (Q), on investment outlays of each Firm I i (I i ∈ R + 0 ) and on the social costs of emissions D(E), whereby E denotes the amount of emissions. D(E) is the social damage in terms of willingness to pay and fulfills the following conditions:
Therefore, social welfare, denoted by W , is given by
The inverse demand function is linear and the product price p ≥ 0 is
with b > 0.
Without investing in R&D, no emission abatement technology available to the firms.
But the firms can invest in the development of a perfect abatement technology, whereby this technology has the same properties as the conventional technology except for the fact that it causes no emissions. The demand is independent of the technology as well. Ulph and Ulph (1996) denote this R&D process as environmental R&D. A firm develops the environmental friendly technology with the probability Θ(I i ), whereat both firms research independently of each other and it is possible that both firms develop the new technology. 2 Θ is continuous and has the following properties 4 Emission Taxation, Tax-Subsidy Schemes, and Holdup Problems
Emission Taxation
As a starting point of regulation, we consider the standard emission taxation, denoted by tax-REG, whereat the tax revenues are passed on to the consumers via a lump-sum-transfer.
Under tax-REG, the regulator maximises W , taking the investment and licence decisions of the firms as given.
Hold-up Problems
There can occur two different kinds of hold-up problems, which we will refer to. The first one is the one with respect to the investment level of the firms. We define:
The hold-up problem with respect to investment (HUP I ) exists, if and only if firms invest ceteris paribus less than it would be welfare maximising.
The second hold-up problem is the one with respect to the licence decisions. It is desired from a welfare point of view that the firm, which had no success in R&D, purchases the 
Tax-Subsidy Scheme
As an alternative to tax-REG we consider a self-financing tax-subsidy scheme. Our selffinancing constraint ensures that no funds from the government budget are needed. The government commits to use the following self-financing tax-subsidy scheme: 
Announcement of the Subsidy Rate
The regulator announces the subsidy rate s ann : The polluting firm 2 has to pay the tax rate
and the non-polluting firm 1 is subsidised by the rate
whereby Π * 2 denotes the second firm's pretax net profit (the net profit without consideration of tax payment tq 2 ). By this rules the regulator always ensures that the self-financing condition (the gains from taxation equal the subsidy outlays) is fulfilled in all circumstances, that is any combination of q 1 , q 2 and s ann . Therefore there are no incentives for firm 2 to attempt to violate the self-financing condition. If the implementation of s ann would violate the self-financing condition given the production quantities q 1 and q 2 , rules (6) and (7) would lead to a downward adjustment of s and t until the self-financing condition is fulfilled.
The regulator maximises social welfare by announcing the subsidy rate
, which means that s * is an element of the subgame perfect equilibrium our five-stage game. We define
Definition 3
The use of the tax-subsidy scheme with the announcement of the subsidy rate s * is denoted by s-REG.
Announcement of the Tax Rate
The regulator announces the tax rate t ann : Net profits Π 1 and Π 2 are realised. The regulator taxes the polluting firm 2 by the tax rate
and subsidises the non-polluting firm 1 by the subsidy rate
whereby Π * 2 again denotes the second firm's pretax net profit. As before, rules (8) and (9) provide for the fulfillment of the self-financing condition.
The regulator maximises social welfare by announcing the tax rate t ann = t * = . To let our analysis not become to complex, we assume that the regulator can commit himself to implement the rate t * . If (10) holds, this assumption has does not influence the results. In other cases it would be possible, that the regulator could increase W by implementing another tax rate if just one firm uses the environmental friendly technology. But in all cases the commitment to t * yields the highest investment incentives, why this regulation measure is interesting as a benchmark. We define: 4 A proof is available upon request.
Definition 4
The use of the tax-subsidy scheme with the announcement of the tax rate t * is denoted by t-REG. typically affect several variables, namely the investment decision I, the licence decision and the production quantities q i . 5 It could happen for example, that one regulatory measure causes less emissions due to a higher I, but stronger product market distortions than another measure.
Solving Hold-up Problems
Now we turn our attention to both hold-up problems and analyse the investment as well as the licencing decisions. We denote the firm's investment decision under a certain regulation holds. Then we have
From proposition 4 follows, that the expected social welfare Exp[W ] is the same under t-REG and tax-REG if the marginal emission damage is that high, that the regulator picks a tax rate t K as high as possible, which means
. The intuition is the as follows:
The regulation of t-REG and tax-REG differ only if exactly one firm uses the non-polluting technology. And then the tax rate
yields the same equilibrium under t-REG and tax-REG, since the non-polluting firm becomes a monopolist in both cases. Because we would like to find the welfare best of the three regulatory measures, but we can not compare the measures on the actual basis, we specify S and Θ in the following section.
Analysis with Specification of S and θ
In this section we specify the damage function S and the function of the discovery probability Θ so as to compare tax-REG, s-REG, and t-REG on the basis of parameters. We would like to discover, under which circumstances which of the three regulatory measures yields a higher expected social welfare Exp [E] . In doing so, we discuss whether the result is dependent on the parameter that characterises the damage function S.
9 A proof is available upon request.
Model
Since our analysis with the up to now applied damage function D did not yield a complete ranking order of our three measures with respect of maximising expected social welfare
Exp[W ], we specify S to get information about the situation when HUP I exists as well.
Additionally, we replace the condition for the existence HUP I , namely
with a condition dependent on D. We assume the following emission damage function D, which has a constant marginal damage of the emission generating production quantity Q E :
with e > 0.
Now, the inverse demand function p = 1− bQ respectively the damage function D = eQ E are parametrised and can be characterised by b respectively e. We can deduce the following corollary since e > 7 30 holds if and only if t K > 2 5 holds:
For the sake of simplicity we assume the following function of the discovery probability:
A Firm i ( i = 1, 2) develops the emission abatement technology with the probability
The assumption of that functional form of Θ necessitates that no firm invests more than
Since no profit maximising firm will invest more than the monopoly profit in R&D, which is 1 4b
, the following assumption ensures investments smaller than
ε is chosen sufficiently small:
Analysis
In this subsection, we would like to figure out, which of our three alternative mechanism maximises the expected social welfare Exp[W ]. We start with the comparison of s-REG and t-REG. 
Comparison of s-REG and t-REG
for all e (> 0) and all b (≥
4
). 10 It turns out that s-REG is preferable towards t-REG, since ), then the damage of emissions D is relatively meaningless and it is not worth to invest in R&D. In such a situation, tax-REG is preferable towards s-REG, since firms invest less under tax-REG.
We consider two examples with a non-linear marginal damage of emissions. In both examples, s-REG yields the highest expected social welfare.
2 . We have
We have
Results
In this section we have assumed a constant marginal damage of emissions and have in particular assumed a damage function of the form D = eQ E . Furthermore, we have assumed that a firm develops the environmental friendly technology with the probability Θ = √ I i . Therefore s-REG dominates the other two regulatory measures, if the marginal damage of emissions exceeds a certain level, which is the more interesting case.
Conclusions
In the present paper we considered hold-up problems in the context of environmental R&D investments and licencing of environmentally friendly technologies. We analysed whether hold-up problems in a Cournot-duopoly can be solved by using self-financing tax-subsidy schemes and whether one can increase social welfare by using that schemes instead of a standard emission taxation. The hold-up problems were defined under an emission taxation regime.
There can occur two different types of hold-up-problems. The first hold-up problem is the problem with respect to the investment decision and the second problem is the one with respect to the licence decision. In our analysis, we have compared the standard emission taxation and two different tax-subsidy schemes, namely one with the announcement of the subsidy rate and one with the announcement of the tax rate. If exactly one firm has developed an environmental friendly technology, then the tax-subsidy scheme with the announcement of the tax rate does not yield the licencing of the technology, whereas the tax-subsidy scheme with the announcement of the subsidy rate always yields the licencing. That is why only the announcement of the subsidy rate solves the hold-up problem with respect to licencing. But the tax-subsidy scheme with the announcement of the tax rate yields the highest investment expenditures in R&D of environmentally friendly technologies, wherefore the announcement of the tax rate is best in solving hold-up problems with respect to the investment decision.
In a specified model with a constant marginal damage of emissions, we have compared the expected social welfare under the three regulatory measures. It turns out that the taxsubsidy scheme with the announcement of the subsidy rate dominates both, the tax-subsidy scheme with the announcement or the tax rate and the standard emission taxation, if the marginal damage of emissions exceeds a certain level. Two examples with a non-linear marginal damage of emissions yielded the same result.
